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Is Short-Time Work a Good Method to Keep Unemployment Down?
* 
 
Short-time work compensation aims at reducing lay-offs by allowing employers to temporarily 
reduce hours worked while compensating workers for the induced loss of income. These 
programs are now widespread in the OECD countries, notably following the 2008-2009 crisis. 
This paper discusses the efficiency of this type of policy and investigates its impact on 
unemployment and employment. There is some evidence that short-time compensation 
programs stabilize permanent employment and reduce unemployment during downturns. All 
in all, it seems that short-time work programs used in the recent downturn had significant 
beneficial effects. This suggests that countries which do not have short-time compensation 
programs could benefit from their introduction. But short-time compensation programs can 
also induce inefficient reductions in working hours and reduce the prospects of outsiders if 
used too intensively. Thus, the design of short-time compensation programs should include 
an experience-rating component. 
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Short-time  compensation  (or  short-time  work,  STW)  aims  at  reducing  lay-offs  by  allowing 
employers to temporarily reduce hours worked while compensating workers for the induced loss 
of income. At present, short-time work schemes are widespread among OECD countries. They 
are operated in 25 of the 33 OECD countries. However, there are large cross-country differences 
in take-up rates, which go from zero to 7.4% of employees in 2009.
1 Moreover, there has been a 
very important spread of short-time work during the 2008 -2009 recession: the OECD average 
take-up rate was  less than 0.2% in the fourth quarter of 2007, just before the recession, and 
ballooned to 1.3 % in the fourth quarter of 2009.  
 
In the recent recession, u nemployment did not increase in some European countries featuring 
widespread and generous short-time compensation programs as much as it did in other countries. 
The leading example is  Germany that makes a particularly intensive use of  a short-time work 
program (the Kurzarbeit). This success induced a renewal of interest in short-time work which 
may appear as a good method to keep unemployment down in recessions. As a matter of fact, the 
interest for such schemes is not new. The idea that it could be more efficient and more equitable 
to  share  jobs  with  short-time  compensation  rather  than  destroying  jobs  during  recessions  is 
recurrently put forth by advocates of work-sharing. For instance, Abraham and Houseman (1994) 
argued that although the use of short-time work or the recourse to layoffs during a cyclical 
downturn may be reasonably close substitutes from the employer's point of view, they are quite 
different  from  the  employee's  perspective.  Dismissed  workers  are  likely  to  face considerable 
uncertainty about whether and when they will find a job and may experience long unemployment 
spells, which represent a loss of income for them and their families and a loss of resources for the 
society. Abraham and Houseman also argue that extensive reliance on layoffs is less equitable 
than work-sharing, because it concentrates the costs of adjustment on a relatively small number 
of workers who suffer large losses of income and other job-related benefits. Instead, short-time 
work arrangements spread the costs of adjustment more evenly across members of the work 
force. These might be important arguments in favor of short-time work to accommodate cyclical 
fluctuations in demand. 
 
In this paper, we argue that optimal unemployment insurance systems may include short-time 
compensation programs. However, short-time compensation programs are not a panacea. They 
                                                                 
1 This refers to quarterly data, not yearly averages as shown in Figure 1. 4 
 
must be carefully designed to improve efficiency. Actually, there is some evidence that short-time 
compensation  programs  stabilize  permanent  employment  and  reduce  unemployment  during 
downturns.  But  short-time  compensation  programs  can  also  induce  inefficient  reductions  in 
working hours. Moreover, workers in permanent jobs have incentives to support such schemes in 
recessions in order to protect their jobs. Employers also have incentives to support short-time 
compensation programs in countries where stringent job protection induces high firing costs. 
Therefore, there is a risk to use these programs too intensively, for the benefits of insiders and at 
the expense of outsiders whose entry into employment can be made more even more difficult. In 
order to deal with this risk and to avoid inefficient reductions in working-hours, the design of 
short-time  compensation  programs  should  include  an  experience-rating  component.  This 
component would lead to a scheduling of employers’ social contributions so that they bear a 
significant share of the cost induced by their participation in the program.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  1,  we  describe  the  evolution  of  short-time 
compensation  programs  in  the  recent  recession.  In  section  2,  we  discuss  the  economic 
justifications of these programs. From a normative perspective, we begin by recalling that optimal 
unemployment insurance may include short-time compensation programs. Then, we analyze the 
existence of short-time work programs from a positive perspective to understand their potential 
consequences on actual labor markets of the OECD countries. Finally, in section 3 we present 
empirical evidence about the impact of short-time compensation program on unemployment, 
employment and hours. 
 
1. SHORT-TIME WORK ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE AND DURING 
THE CRISIS 
 
1.1. HOW DOES IT WORK AND WHERE? 
 
Short-time work is an option within the unemployment insurance systems that allows employers 
to  reduce  the  hours  of  workers  for  economic  reasons,  while  permitting  workers  to  receive 
compensation for their partial layoff. Compensation is usually supported by the unemployment 5 
 
insurance schemes, in the form of partial unemployment benefits, by special funds, by the State, 
or sometimes by a combination of these sources.
1  
Before the 2008-2009 crisis,  short-time work schemes were already  widespread in the  OECD 
countries:
2 such schemes existed in 18 countries. In 2009, they operated in 25 of the 33 OECD 
countries (see Figure 1), including most of the  Continental European countries,  and only 5 
countries had no  short-time work schemes.
 3  Among the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland 
and Norway have short-time work schemes, and among the English-speaking countries Canada, 
Ireland, New Zealand and the US have such schemes. 
Of course, the design and regulation of short-time work schemes varies greatly across countries 
(Hijzen and Venn, 2010). First, firms are usually required to meet a number of eligibility criteria 
to enter into short-time work arrangements. For instance, 80% of countries require firms to 
prove  that  economic  factors  make  short-time  work  necessary  (decline  in  production  or  in 
business activity). 55% of countries require collective agreements, and other countries usually 
require either consultation with employees or individual agreements. In 40% of the reviewed 
countries,  employees must also be eligible to unemployment benefits on an individual  basis. 
Southern Europe countries usually set much less stringent stringent eligibility requirements than 








                                                                 
1 Partial unemployment benefits are considered part of short-time work schemes. Part-time unemployment benefits 
are not. Partial benefits are paid by the unemployment insurance to employees and relate to specific employers who 
reduce working-time. Part-time benefits are paid to people who are unemployed but work for some time over the 
reference period (part-time unemployed) independently of employers, notably in countries where unemployment 
benefits can top-up some earned income.  
2 The countries which created new schemes during the crisis (usually at the end of 2008 or the beginning of 2009) are 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
3 Australia, the United Kingdom, Greece, Iceland and Sweden. For 4 countries, the information on STW schemes is 
not available (Chile, Estonia, and Slovenia). 
4 For the purpose of the empirical analysis in sections 1.2 and 3.3, an eligibility index is built: its value is 0 when no 
criteria is requested for entry into short-time work schemes, and each additional criteria is assigned a value of either 
for 1, or 0.5 for those which only apply to some categories of employees (e.g. blue-collars). 6 
 
Figure 1: Short-time work take-up rates in the OECD countries  
as a percentage of employees 
0 2 4 6































 Source: OECD (2010) and Hijzen and Venn (2010) data completed by the authors 
Note:  * no schemes in Australia, the U.K., Greece, Iceland, and Sweden. Data are missing for Chile,  Estonia, 
Mexico, and Slovenia. Country codes: AS: Australia; AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CA:Canada; CH: Switzerland; CZ: 
Czech Republic; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; ES: Spain; FI: Finland; FR: France; GB: United Kingdom; GR: 
Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IS: Iceland; IT: Italy; JP: Japan; KR : Korea; LU: Luxembourg; NL: Netherlands ; 
NO: Norway; NZ: New Zealand; PL : Poland; PT : Portugal ; SE : Sweden ; SK: Slovak Republic; TR: Turkey; US: 
United States.  7 
 
 
Short-time work schemes are also most often conditional to one (most often) or several actions 
to be taken by firms or employees. Those include the commitment not to dismiss employees for 
a certain period after the end of short-time work compensation (6 countries, half in Western 
Europe), job search requirements (5 countries), the design of a recovery plan (4 countries), and 
training  of  employees  (4  countries).  Nordic  countries  make  short-time  work  compensation 
conditional to job search, while Asian countries (Japan and Korea) set no conditions at all like the 
English-speaking countries.
1 
Regarding the generosity of schemes, the key parameters to consider are the maximum number 
of hours that can be compensated  per employee, the maximum duration of compensati on, the 
net replacement rate, and the remaining cost of reduced hours (OECD, 2010, Hijzen and Venn, 
2010
2). These parameters were often modified in 2008 in countries where schemes existed before 
the crisis in order to make short-time work even more appealing. As such, in 2009: 
  Working-time reduction can be either total or partial, depending on each schemes’ rules. 
For instance, a 100% cut in hours can sometimes be justified when a production unit 
must  be  temporarily  shut  down  because  inventories  are  too  high.  On  average,  the 
permissible working-time reduction, i.e. the share of normal working-time that can be 
cut
3, is 74%. For the 3 Nordic countries, the average is 63%, while it is only 38% for the 
English-speaking countries. Half of the countries allow for reductions in hours between 
90% and 100% of normal  working-time,  with higher rates in Eastern and Southern 
Europe.   
  A  maximum  duration  of  compensation  prevails  in  all  countries,  notably  because  the 
economic reasons that normally justify short-time work must be temporary by nature. 
The country average is approximately 15 months, but this parameter also varies a lot 
across countries, from 3 months in the Slovak Republic to 28 months in Japan (and even 
                                                                 
1 Similarly to what is done with eligibility criteria, a conditionality index is built: its value is 0 when no condition is 
associated with short-time compensation, and each additional condition is assigned a value of either for 1, or 0.5 for 
those which only apply to some categories of employees. 
2  We  follow  here  the  analytical  framework  set  ou  by  Hijzen  and  Venn,  2010.  We  have  used  the  value  of  the 
parameters they identified for 2009, and we have completed these data with values for 2007 (before the crisis) for the 
parameters used in section 3.3. 
3 For instance, if in one given country the minimum working-time reduction is, say 10% and the maximum is 100%, 
the overall permissible reduction is 90% of working time. The possibility to cut working-time by smaller amounts 
allows the employers to use short-time work schemes more easily and more frequently. The maximum reduction 
provides another obvious margin of flexibility. The permissive working-time reduction allows us to take into account 
these two different margins of flexibility in the use of short-time work.  8 
 
longer  in  Finland  where  the  36-month  limit  was  removed  during  the  crisis
1).  In the 
Nordic countries  the maximum duration varies a lot (6 months only in Denmark, 12 
months in Norway, no limit in Finland), while its average is  only 9 months for the 
English-speaking countries. Duration is maximal among Southern Europe countries with 
22 months on average. 
  The net replacement rate can be calculated as the ratio of the net income of employees in 
the  scheme to the net income  that would  stem from  normal  working time.  In most 
countries, income falls progressively as hours fall further below their normal level.
2 On 
average the minimum compensation rate is 71% of the full-time wage. As a comparison 
the full-time unemployment net replacement rate is 58% on average
3 in the first month of 
unemployment  in  the  same  countries.  In  Denmark  and  Norway
4,  the  average 
compensation rate is the highest among countries at 78% ( as a comparison, 59% for 
unemployment benefits), and in  English-speaking countries this rate reaches a low 62% 
(46% for unemployment benefits).  
  In a majority of countries, employers bear a share of the total cost of compensation for 
each reduced hour. This is obviously a way to cope with moral hazard issues and to incite 
firms to not abuse the system. Among the 14 countries where employers contribute, the 
remaining cost per hour not worked
5 is close  to 20% of the total normal labo r cost. 
Among the Nordic countries, Norwegian employers pay a below -average cost of  17%, 
while their counterparts in  the English-speaking countries (the US and New Zealand) 
bear an above-average cost of 32%. 
1.2.  AN OVERVIEW OF TAKE-UP BEFORE AND DURING THE CRISIS. 
 
Even in the context of the exceptional downturn that most of the OECD economies experienced 
in 2008 and 2009, the recourse to short-time work varies a lot across countries. Take-up can be 
measured as the ratio of short-time work participants to the total number of employees in a given 
                                                                 
1 However, a maximum payment period of 500 full-time equivalent working days remains. 
2 In Hungary and Korea however, workers receive their full wage for all reduced hours (Hijzen and Venn, 2010) 
3 For a single worker with no children earning the average wage. The data come from the OECD taxes and benefits 
database. 
4 This information is not available for Finland. 
5 For a single worker with no children earning the average wage. 9 
 
country.
1 In 2009, six countries where short-time work existed prior to the crisis stand out with 
take-up rates above 2% of employees: Belgium, Turkey, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg and Japan  
(see Figure 1).  
At the other end of the scale, the countries of Northern Europe (except Finland) either show low 
take-up rates (such as Denmark and Norway , below 1%), or no  short-time work scheme at all 
(such as Iceland and Sweden).  The English-speaking countries (except Ireland) show a similar 
pattern (take-up below 0.5% in Canada, New Zealand and the U.S., no scheme in Australia and 
the U.K.). 
In most countries where schemes existed prior to the crisis, participation in  short-time work 
arrangements has dramatically increased  since the last quarter of 2008,  or at the beginning of 
2009, to reach unprecedented levels (except in Norway and Belgium where levels were similar or 
close to the levels in 2003, see Figure 2, and in Germany, where take-up rates were very high in 
1993 – not shown). 
The magnitude of the recession is of course one of the determinants of the recourse to short-
time work. A high take-up of short-time work on average in 2009 is usually associated with a 
strong decline in industrial production measured between end-2008 and end-2009 (see Figure 3, 
using the OECD industrial production index). Interestingly, countries with high take-up rates in 
2009 are also those where the production index recovered significantly over the same year. This 
can  be  interpreted  in  various  ways,  one  rationale  being  that  countries  where  the  decline  in 
industrial production was the largest at the end of 2008 were also those where the expected 
rebound  would  be  the  largest  in  2009  (once  inventories  have  reached  a  bottom);  another 
explanation is that in those countries the labor force in the industry was maintained during the 
crisis, allowing firms to react more quickly to the upturn. 
Cross-country  institutional  differences  in  short-time  work  schemes  are  also  related  to  the 
dispersion of take-up across countries. Actually, take-up rates do not appear to be related to the 
stringency of conditions required to benefit from short-time compensation (commitment to not 
dismiss employees for a certain period after the end of short-time work compensation, job search 
requirements, the design of a recovery plan, training of employees). The correlation coefficient 
between our conditionality index, and the take-up rate is zero in 2009. It might be that these 
                                                                 
1 This ratio is rather a pseudo take-up rate, since all employees are not necessarily eligible to short-time work 
schemes, depending on the eligibility conditions set in each country. 10 
 






















                                                                 
1 A more sophisticated index including different weight for each specific component could yield different results; but 
the choice of weights would be arbitrary. 11 
 
Figure 2: Short-time work take-up rates in the OECD countries 2003-2010 as a percentage 
of employees. STW : Short-time work take-up rate. Source : OECD (2010) and Hijzen and Venn (2010) 


























































































































































Figure 2 (cont’d): Short-time work take-up rates in the OECD countries 2003-2010  
as a percentage of employees. STW : Short-time work take-up rate. Source : OECD (2010) / Hijzen 















































































































































However, there is a positive correlation, equal to 31% in 2009
1, between the take-up rate and the 
eligibility criteria to enter into short-time work arrangements (including r equirements to prove 
that economic factors make  short-time work necessary, requirement of  collective agreements, 
requirement  of  consu ltation  of  employees  or  of  individual  agreements,  e ligibility  to 
unemployment benefits). Countries with large take-up rates tend also to have more sophisticated 
eligibility systems. Other parameters of short-time schemes are also clearly correlated with ta ke-
up (at least in 2009). The correlation between the take -up rate and the permissible reductions in 
weekly working hours that can be compensated amounts to 43%. For instance,  countries with 
high take-up authorize reductions in hours of at least 50% or more of normal working-time (see 
Figure 4). The correlation between the take -up rate and the maximum duration of the scheme, 
expressed in months, is 28% (see Figure 5).  Similarly, in most countries where take-up is highest, 
the remaining cost of reduced hours for employers is actually 0 or less than 10% of the normal 
total cost (See Figure 6).  
 
  Figure 3: Industrial production index and short-time work take-up rate in 2008-2009  
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Source: OECD (2010) and Hijzen and Venn (2010) data completed by the authors, OECD industrial production 
index 
                                                                 
1 Here and in what follows, a correlation refers to the simple correlation coefficient between two variables, not to the 
regression coefficient i.e. the slope of the lines shown in the scatter Figures. 14 
 
Figure 4: Permissible reductions in weekly working hours and short-time work take-up 
rate
1 
AT AT AT AT
BE BE BE BE
CA CA CA CA
CH CH CH CH
CZ CZ CZ CZ
DE DE DE DE
DK DK DK DK
ES ES ES ES
FI FI FI FI
FR FR FR FR
HU HU HU HU
IE IE IE IE
IT IT IT IT
JP JP JP JP
KR KR KR KR
LU LU LU LU
NL NL NL NL
NO NO NO NO
NZ NZ NZ NZ
PL PL PL PL PT PT PT PT
SK SK SK SK
TR TR TR TR






































20 40 60 80 100
Max hours allowed (% of normal working hours)
 
Source: OECD (2010) and Hijzen and Venn (2010) data completed by the authors 
Figure 5 : Maximum duration of scheme participation and short-time work take-up rate  
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Source: OECD (2010) and Hijzen and Venn (2010) data completed by the authors 
                                                                 
1 Permissible reductions in weekly working hours are the shares of normal working time that can be reduced within 
STW schemes. 15 
 
 
Figure 6 : Average remaining cost for employers and short-time work take-up rate  
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Source: OECD (2010) and Hijzen and Venn (2010) data completed by the authors 
 
2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SHORT-TIME WORK: THEORY 
 
Short-time work can be justified from the point of view of the unemployment insurance system. 
It turns out that it can be efficient to combine short-time compensation provided to short-time 
unemployed workers with unemployment benefits provided to full-time unemployed workers.   
However, the existence of short-time work observed in OECD countries does not necessarily 
rely only on efficiency considerations. The spread of short-time work can also be influenced by 
insiders supporting part-time work in order to try to protect their jobs in deep recessions. This 
implies that part-time work arrangements may potentially protect the jobs of some categories of 




2.1.  OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND SHORT-TIME WORK 
 
The analysis of optimal labor contracts shows that optimal insurance can comprise layoffs and 
short-time work schemes (Rosen, 1985). The precise form of the insurance contract hinges on 
the preferences of workers and on the technology of firms. For instance, Rosen (1985) and 
Fitzroy and Hart (1985) have developed models where the (monthly) wage is flexible and hours 
of  work  adjust  when  productivity  is  above  a  certain  threshold,  while  the  (monthly)  wage  is 
downward rigid and layoffs are used instead when productivity is below this threshold.
1 In such a 
model, it can be optimal to include work-sharing schemes in unemployment insurance. However, 
this analysis assumes that insurance is directly provided by risk-neutral employers, having access 
to  perfect  financial  markets.  Actually ,  in  most  countries  workers  are  covered  by  public 
unemployment insurance systems which face moral hazard issues stemming from the behavior of 
employers and employees.   
From this perspective, the introduction of short -time work arrangements in unemployment 
insurance is often seen as a means to avoid excess layoffs (e.g. Fitzroy and Hart, 1985, Burdett and 
Wright, 1989).
2 In the presence of  an unemployment insurance which provides unemployment 
benefits to full-time unemployed workers only, it is well known that  there are excess layoffs if 
employers have no incentives to internalize  the social cost of their decisions . Feldstein (1976), 
and more recently Blanchard and Tirole (2007) as well as Cahuc and Zylberberg (2008) , claimed 
that experience-rating systems, where employers’ social contributions depend on the induced 
social cost of their firing decisions, can be used to reduce excess layoffs. These layoffs can be 
completely eliminated when there is full experience-rating, i.e. when each firm fully covers the 
induced  social  cost  of  its  firing  decisions.  However,  there  are  limits  to  experience-rating.
3 
Notably, many firms -  especially small ones which have a limited access to financial markets  - 
may face financial constraints in the short -run and go bankrupt if they have to cover the social 
costs of their layoffs. For these reasons, full  experience-rating is unlikely to be optimal and 
unemployment insurance is  necessarily plagued with excess layoffs. In these circumstances, a 
                                                                 
1 In their framework, the production technology is multiplicatively separable between hours and workers, and there 
is no income effect on labor supply.  
2 Although there is a quite abundant literature on optimal unemployment insurance, there are only  a few recent 
papers  about  the  optimality  of  short-time  work  schemes.  Most  recent  research  about  optimal  unemployment 
insurance focused on the optimal level of unemployment benefits, their time profile during the unemployment spell, 
the impact of sanctions, the consequences of monitoring (Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006) and the desirability of 
experience-rating (Blanchard and Tirole, 2009). In most recent papers, hours are not taken into account. Workers 
can either work or be unemployed.  
3 See Blanchard and Tirole (2007) for a discussion. 17 
 
system  combining  short-time  work  arrangements  with  unemployment  benefits  seems  more 
equitable  and efficient than  unemployment benefits only.  This  system  can be more  efficient 
because it reduces excess lay-offs encouraged by the implicit subsidies paid out by the public 
unemployment insurance. It is also more equitable because short-time schemes distribute the 
adjustment burden over a large number of workers (Abraham and Houseman, 1994, Walsh et al., 
1997; Vroman and Brusentev, 2009). 
However, Burdett and Wright (1989) claimed that short-time work is not a panacea.  In fact, the 
same problem which plagues unemployment insurance, i.e. excess lay-offs in the case of partially 
experience-rated systems, also creates distortions under short-time work arrangements. Short-
time schemes implemented by unemployment insurance can bias downwards the average number 
of hours worked because they subsidize reductions in working time. Accordingly, they induce 
inefficient reductions in working-time in the absence of incentive schemes that would limit their 
recourse. An experience-rating system, where employers and employees reimburse the cost due 
to  their  utilization  of  short-time  work,  may  provide  adequate  incentives
1. Unfortunately, as 
mentioned above,  full  experience-rating  is generally not efficient when firms have access to 
imperfect financial markets, and excess short-time cannot be fully eliminated
2.  
Finally,  the  analysis  of  une mployment  insurance  in  a  second -best  environment  featuring 
imperfect financial markets suggests that an efficient system should combine unemployment 
benefits given to unemployed workers, short -time work schemes and  experience-rating which 
implies that social contributions paid by employers  to finance unemployment insurance depend 
on the costs induced by their layoffs  and by their utilization of short-time work schemes. The 
precise optimal combination of these different elements depends on the preferences of workers, 
on the technology of firms and on the functioning of markets. This might explain the strong 
cross-country heterogeneity in the implementation of short-time work schemes described in the 
previous section. For instance, it might be true that countries in which workers have a strong 
aversion for geographic mobility, because they have strong family ties (Alesina et al., 2010) or 
strong local ties (Janiack and Wasmer, 2010), favor adjustments of hours of work and income at 
the expense of layoffs. In countries where commuting costs and imperfections of the housing 
                                                                 
1 Other strategies of limitations to STW recourse have been implemented by some countries instead, such as a share 
of the benefits directly borne by employers, or the commitment not to lay off workers for some time after the short-
time work period has ended.  
2 In practice, experience-rating has been implemented in the United States only, including for temporary layoffs. See 
Burdett and Wright (1989). The fact that no other country has implemented this system yet can stem from political 
economy (winners, losers) or practical considerations (potential complexity) rather than because the system might 
not be fully efficient. 18 
 
markets induce a decline in geographical mobility, workers and employers might also display the 
same preference.  
2.2 INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER REGULATIONS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
ISSUES 
 
Most countries where  it is more  difficult  to lay  off  workers  have also designed  institutional 
mechanisms  to  make  these  discharges  less  necessary.  Short-time  work  schemesare  one  such 
measure.  When  layoffs  are  costly,  employers  have  incentives  to  support  short-time  schemes 
which allow them to save on firing costs. Short-time work arrangements are also supported by 
insiders, who may prefer part-time unemployment combine with some work income to full time 
unemployment.  
As claimed by the OECD (2010, chap 1), there is some evidence of a cross-country trade-off in 
regulations affecting internal and external flexibility. Short-time work schemes also tend to be 
more  developed  in  countries  with  stricter  employment  protection  rules,  notably  Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Turkey. This is apparent on Figure 7, which displays the relation 
between  short-time  work  rates  in  2009  and  the  OECD’s  overall  strictness  of  employment 
protection  index.  There  is  a  positive  correlation  between  the  stringency  of  employment 
protection  and  short-time  work  take-up  rates.  The  correlation  coefficient  between  quarterly 
short-time-work  rates  and  the  OECD  overall  employment  protection  index  over  the  period 
2007-2009 is equal to 22 %.  
Figure 7: Employment protection indexes and short-time work take-up rate 
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Source: OECD (2010) and Hijzen and Venn (2010) data completed by the authors, OECD’s Employment protection 
index 19 
 
One may also expect a relation between short-time work rates and unemployment benefits. This 
relation can rely on different mechanisms. To the extent that short-time work schemes generally 
constitute a part of unemployment insurance, more generous unemployment insurance systems 
can  have  higher  unemployment  benefits  and  more  generous  short-time  work  arrangements. 
However, the relation between short-time work rates and unemployment benefits is also the 
consequence  of  a  trade-off  between  short-time  compensation  and  unemployment  benefits. 
Figure 8 displays the relation between unemployment benefits replacement rates and short-time 
work rates in the OECD countries in 2009. The correlation coefficient between quarterly short-
time work rates and unemployment benefits replacement rates for OECD countries over the 
period 2007-2009 is positive but small, and equal to 11 percent.  
 Figure 8: Unemployment benefits net replacement rate and short-time work take-up rate  
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Source: OECD (2010) and Hijzen and Venn (2010) data completed by the authors, OECD tax and benefits database. 
The  positive  relations  between  short-time  work  schemes  on  one  hand  and  unemployment 
benefits and job protection on the other hand suggest that cross-country differences in short-
time  work  schemes  do  not  only  reflect  efficiency  considerations.  They  might  also  reflect 
differences in the power of insiders. This implies that short-time schemes are not necessarily 




3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
In  this  section,  we  analyze  the  effects  of  short-time  work  on  hours,  employment  and 
unemployment. We first provide a brief survey  of the literature. Then, we present empirical 
evidence on the consequences of short-time work in the recent recession using cross-country 
data over the period 2003-2009. 
3.1. FIRM-LEVEL STUDIES 
Some studies use firm-level data to explore the impact of short-time work schemes on various 
outcomes, including employment. Calavrezo et al. (2009a, b) assess the impact of short-time work 
arrangements in France on layoffs and firm survival. Surprisingly, they find that short-time work 
is associated with more layoffs and lower survival of firms. This may indicate a selection bias 
problem due to the fact that participating firms tend to be less competitive than other firms. If 
this selection problem is not adequately addressed, it may be falsely concluded that short-time 
compensation programs result in more layoffs and more destructions of firms.  
There are also several studies focused on Kurzarbeit, the well-known and long-standing STW 
program in Germany. Deeke (2005) showed that a high proportion of firms using Kurzarbeit did 
not reduce their payrolls and hire new staff with more flexible nonstandard work contracts such 
as  "Mini-Jobs".  In  fact,  companies  employing  workers  with  flexible  work  contracts  (e.g. 
temporary and part-time contract, freelancer) rely less on short-time schemes, which suggests that 
short-time  schemes  are  a  way  to  enhance  internal  flexibility,  especially  when  employment 
protection legislation is stringent. 
The report of Berkeley Planning Associates & Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (1997) reviews 
short-time compensation programs in the United States. When the report was released, 17 states 
operated short-time compensation programs, 36 states and jurisdictions did not. These programs 
were implemented between the late 1970s and the mid 1990s. The report does not yield clear-cut 
conclusions about the impact of short-time compensation schemes on unemployment insurance 
systems and on layoffs. This report also mentions that the extensive repeat use of short-time 
compensation  and  the  greater  economic  distress  among  short-time  compensation  firms  than 
non-  short-time  compensation  firms,  should  deserve  further  investigation  to  deal  with  the 
selection bias problem which plagues the results of empirical work relying on firm-level data. 
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3.2. COUNTRY LEVEL AND INDUSTRY LEVEL STUDIES 
The contribution of Abraham and Houseman (1994) was the first study to yield systematic cross-
country evidence about the consequences of short-time schemes. Abraham and Houseman were 
challenging  the  idea  that  job  security  regulations  which  became  more  stringent  in  European 
countries in the 1970s and in the 1980s, were significantly slowing down the adjustment of total 
hours of work to an unexpected shock. They argued that strong job security regulations have 
typically been accompanied by measures intending to facilitate alternatives to layoff such as work-
sharing. Abraham and Houseman wanted to understand whether and to what extent variations in 
working  hours  offered  employers  a  viable  substitute  to  adjustment  through  layoffs.  For  this 
purpose, they compare aggregate adjustment patterns in employment and hours worked across 
countries and over time using quarterly time-series data for Belgium, France, Germany and the 
United States. They find that the adjustment of employment to changes in output is much slower 
in  the  German,  French  and  Belgian  manufacturing  sectors  than  in  the  United  States 
manufacturing  sector,  even  though  the  adjustment  of  total  hours  worked  (i.e.  hours  times 
employment) appears to be similar in the former countries. The adjustment of weekly hours is 
faster in Belgium, France and Germany where short-time compensation programs operate. 
Van Audenrode (1994) analyzes the adjustment of hours and employment in 10 OCED countries 
over the period 1969-1988. He finds that five countries display comparably fast adjustments in 
total  hours:  the  United  States,  Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and Sweden.  In the  four European 
countries,  this  quick  adjustment  in  total  hours  happens  despite  much  slower  employment 
adjustments than  in  the United  States.  Van Audenrode  argues that there are more  generous 
short-time  systems  in  these  European  countries  than  in  the  United  States.
1  Therefore,  he 
concludes that generous short-time compensation programs result in flexible work and foster fast 
adjustment in total hours despite restrictions on firings. He also argues that working-time is not 
flexible enough to compensate for the slower employment adjustments generated by the 
restrictions on firings in the countries with less generous or with no short -time compensation 
programs.
2 Van Audenrode finds that the overall labor adjustments end up being as flexible as in 
the United States in countries with strong job protection because  working-time  adjustments 
compensate for restrictions on firings.  
                                                                 
1  Note that Sweden does not have any government-support system for short-time work. 
2 Japan behaves differently than the other countries in the sample. Despite having few formal restrictions on firings, 
employment adjusts very slowly. This observation corresponds to the traditional image of a large share of Japanese 
labor market providing lifetime jobs. However, despite having generous short-time compensation programs, Japan 
does not seem to have fast adjustment of  hours either. One possible explanation could be that the margin  of 
adjustment is more often earnings than hours (via the fluctuations in bonuses). 22 
 
The two previous studies of Abraham and Houseman (1994) and Van Audenrode (1994) give 
some evidence on the consequences of short-time work schemes before the 1990s. After the 
publication of these two studies, short-time work schemes did not catch much attention among 
economists. However, the strong increase in short-time work during the recent recession has 
sparked off a renewal of interest.  
The recent paper by Hijzen and Venn (2010) from the OECD, exploits the cross-country and 
time variation in take-up rates to analyze the quantitative impacts of short-time compensation 
programs on employment and average hours in the 2008-09 recession. Their analysis is based on 
quarterly data for the period 2003-2009 for 19 countries OECD countries and four industries 
(manufacturing, construction, distribution and business services). It also distinguishes between 
permanent workers and temporary workers. Among the 19 countries, 11 countries operated a 
short-time  compensation  scheme  during  the  entire  period,  five  countries  introduced  a  new 
scheme during the crisis period and three countries never had a short-time compensation scheme 
during the sample period.  The impact of short-time compensation programs is estimated with an 
interaction  term  between  a  dummy  signalling  the  2008-2009  recession  and  another  variable 
measuring  the  extent  of short-time  compensation  programs  in  each  country.    The estimates 
support the  conclusion  that short-time  compensation programs had an important impact  on 
preserving permanent jobs during the economic downturn, with the largest proportional impacts in 
Japan and Germany. Using the baseline estimates, it is found that 0.7 to 0.8% of jobs were saved 
in Germany and Japan, respectively. Their estimates suggest that STW had no significant impact 
on either the employment or average hours of temporary workers. 
Similarly, Arpai et al. (2010) evaluate the impact of short-time compensation programs in the 
2008-2009 recession with data covering 27 European Countries over the period 1991Q2-2009Q3. 
The dependent variable is the annualized change in employment in the manufacturing sector. The 
impact of short-time compensation programs is estimated with an interaction term between a 
dummy signalling the 2008-2009 recession and another dummy signalling countries with short-
time compensation programs. Country fixed effects are also included. The findings confirm those 
obtained by Hijzen and Venn (2010): the value of the coefficient associated with the interaction 
term is positive and significant. 
This short overview shows that empirical research suggests that short-time work arrangements 
reduce  the  volatility  of  employment  and  increase  the  adjustment  of  hours.  However,  our 
knowledge is still very limited. Empirical studies are weakened by important selection biases and 
endogeneity  issues.  Studies  which  rely  on  firm-level  data  have  difficulties  to  deal  with  the 23 
 
selection bias due to the fact that participating firms tend to be less competitive than other firms. 
In studies relying on cross-country data, the issue of the endogeneity of short-time compensation 
programs is not addressed. Yet, the recent recession shows that governments and social partners 
improved access to short-time work schemes when unemployment increased, in order to try to 
limit job destructions.  
 
3.3 THE IMPACT OF SHORT-TIME WORK IN THE RECENT RECESSION 
 
We  now  analyze  the  consequences  of  short-time  work  programs  on  unemployment  and 
employment in the recent recession. To deal with this issue, we use the OECD (2010) quarterly 
database  on  short-time  work  take-up  rates,  which  is  updated  to  include  a  larger  number  of 
countries  (up  to  25).  Unemployment  and  employment  quarterly  data  are  from  the  OECD 
harmonized labor market database, which is built from national Labor force surveys (no seasonal 
adjustment). 
To evaluate the  relation between short-time  compensation programs and unemployment, we 
estimate the following model:     
 
where    denotes the unemployment rate of country c  at date t.   is a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 from the date of entry of the world economy into the recession (the first quarter 
of 2008) and which is 0 before this date.    is the short-time work take-up rate in country c 
at date t.   is a vector of time invariant controls, which comprises indicators of employment 
protection  legislation  and  of  the  generosity  of  unemployment  benefits  proxied  by  the  net 
replacement  ratio.
1    is  a  country  fixed  effect   which  includes  all  the  ti me  invariant 
characteristics, like the degree of coordination of wage bargaining for instance .   is an error 
term.  
                                                                 
1  To  the  extent  that  there  are  very  little  changes  in  the  employment  protection  legislation  indexes  and  in  the 
replacement ratios, we consider only the average of these variables over the period 2007-2009. This strategy has the 
advantage to avoid to deal with the potential endogeneity of these policies during the recession. Indeed, it is possible 
that strong increases in unemployment induce government to change these policies. For the same reason, we do not 
include active labor market policies in the regressions. It is also possible to introduce an interaction between the 
short-time work take-up rate and the time dummy. However, since the short-time work take up rate is either equal to 
zero or very close to zero before the recession in most countries, as shown by Figure 2, there are not enough 
observations to estimate the coefficient associated with such an interaction term.  24 
 
This set-up allows us to take into account the impact of a common macroeconomic shock from 
the beginning of the recession. The interaction term between the dummy variable  , which 
represents the shock, and the controls   implies that the impact of the shock can be different 
across countries, as in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). Moreover, our set-up includes country 
fixed effects  which  account for time  invariant unobserved variables that could influence  the 
unemployment rate.  
Let us denote by   the difference between   at date t and its average over the year 2007. Then, 
the equation above can be written as 
 
                           
This equation estimates the relation between changes in the unemployment rate and changes in 
the short-time work take-up rate.  
Figure 9: The cross-country relation between changes in unemployment rates and 
changes in short-time work take-up rate in years 2009-2007. 
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Source: OECD (2010) database, updated by the authors. 
Reading: In Belgium, the unemployment rate increased by 0.2 percentage points from 2007 to 2009 (yearly averages) 
and the short-time work take-up rate increased by 5.8 percentage points over the same period.  
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Figure 10: The cross-country relation between changes in employment rates and changes 
in short-time work take-up rate in years 2009-2007. 
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Source: OECD (2010) database, updated by the authors. 
Reading: In Belgium, the employment rate increased by 0.3 percentage points from 2007 to 2009 (yearly averages) 
and the short-time work take-up rate increased by 5.8 percentage points over the same period.  
 
The relation between changes in unemployment rates and changes in short-time work take-up 
rates between 2007 and 2009 is displayed on Figure 9. At first sight, there is a slightly negative 
relationship  between  these  two  variables.  Some  countries,  like  Germany  and  Belgium, 
experienced  higher  increases  in  take-up  rate  associated  with  lower  unemployment  increases.  
Figure 10, which presents the relation between changes in employment rates and changes in 
short-time work take-up rate leads to a consistent observation: it turns out that the relation 
between changes in employment rates and changes in short-time work take-up rates is slightly 
positive. 
OLS estimates of equation (1) for the unemployment rate are displayed in Table 1. We estimate 
the model over two different periods. First, the period 2008-2009. Second, the period 2009, 
which allows us to evaluate the impact of short-time work at the peak of the recession only.  
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Table 1: Short-time work and unemployment rate  
Dependent variable:   Unemployment rate 
(1)  (2) 




















Period  2008-2009  2009 
Adj. R²  .166  .133 
Observations  200  100 
Note:  Unemployment (resp. STW take-up) rate stands for the difference between the unemployment (resp. short-
time  work  take-up)  rate  and  its  average  over  the  year  2007.  All  other  variables  are  in  level.  OLS  estimates  of 
Equation (1) for the unemployment rate. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% 
level. Standard deviations in brackets. 
Column 1 shows that the coefficient associated with the short-time work take-up rate is positive 
and significant when the estimations cover the period 2008-2009. This positive sign is likely to 
reflect the endogeneity of short-time work, which necessarily increases with unemployment. This 
effect  should  be  stronger  in  the  beginning  of  the  recession,  when  unemployment  increases 
strongly.  This  interpretation  is  consistent  with  the  results  displayed  in  column  2,  where  the 
coefficient associated with the short-time work take-up rate is not anymore significantly different 
from zero. Table 1 also shows that changes in the unemployment rate are strongly associated 
with  the  OECD  indexes  of  employment  protection  legislation.  More  stringent  regulation  of 
regular jobs and of collective dismissals is associated with lower increases in unemployment rates. 
Strikingly, stronger regulation of temporary jobs is not related with change in unemployment.  
The OLS estimation of equation (1) when the dependent variable is the employment rate is 
presented in Table 2. The coefficient associated with short-time work take-up is not significantly 
different from zero. Overall, these results do not allow us to find any significant positive relation 
between the spread of short-time work programs and employment.  
However, it should be stressed that the variable  , standing for short-time take-up rates, is 
likely to be correlated with the error term   in equation (1). There are at least two reasons for 
this.  First,  as  just  explained,  the  rules  of  short-time  work  schemes  imply  that  take-up  rates 27 
 
increase when economic conditions deteriorate and thus when unemployment raises. Second, we 
saw above that several governments introduced short-time work programs in the recent recession 
in order to fight unemployment, while other governments eased the entry into these programs 
when they were already in place before the downturn. Therefore, countries that had stronger 
adverse shocks, corresponding to larger  , could also have larger changes in the regulation of 
short-time work programs. Accordingly, it is important to instrument short-time take-up rates, 
i.e. to find variables correlated with short-time take-up rates from 2008, but not correlated with 
the error term  . Our instrumental variables belong to the set of parameters which describe 
the features of short-time work programs before the entry into the recession, i.e. in 2007. This 
choice is made for two reasons. First, it is likely that the take-up rates have been stronger during 
the recession in countries where short-time work programs existed or were more generous before 
the recession, because it takes time to adapt the regulations and to implement short-time work 
programs. Second, it is likely that the features of short-time work arrangements before the entry 
into the recession are not correlated with the error term   which is related to changes in 
unemployment during the recession. This is our identifying assumption.
1  
Table 2: Short-time work and employment rate 
Dependent variable:    Employment rate 
(1)  (2) 




















Period  2008-2009  2009 
Adj. R²  .143  .252 
Observations  200  100 
Note:  Employment (resp. STW take-up) rate stands for the difference between the employment (resp. short-time 
work take-up) rate and its average over the year 2007. All other variables are in level. OLS estimates of Equation (1) 
for the employment rate. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. Standard 
deviations in brackets.  
Table 3 presents the result of the IV estimates for the period 2008-2009 and for the year 2009 
only.    The  short-time  work  take-up  rate  from  2008Q1  is  instrumented  with  the  permissible 
                                                                 
1 It should be noticed that this identification strategy does not allow us to have time varying instruments. 28 
 
reductions in weekly working hours which can be compensated before 2008 and the short-time 
work take-up rate in 2007. These instruments allow us to account for the generosity of short-time 
work programs and their potential adaptability to economic fluctuations before the recession. With 
these  instruments,  the  assumption  that  short-time  work  is  exogenous  in  equation  (1),  when 
unemployment is the dependent variable, is rejected at a zero percent level of significance for the 
period  2008-2009  as  shown  in  Table  3,  column  1.  The  instruments  pass  the  Sargan  over-
identification test. Table 3, column 1, shows that the coefficient associated with unemployment is 
strongly significant at the five percent level and large: it is not statistically different from 1 in 
absolute value. Column 2 shows that this coefficient has the same magnitude and is significant at 
one percent level when the estimates cover the year 2009 only. As a comparison with the OLS 
method, this coefficient was either positive or not significantly different from zero, depending on 
the period. As we stressed before, such results might reflect an endogeneity bias which is treated 
with the IV methods that yields stable results.
 1 It is also worth noting that regular employment 
protection limits unemployment hikes while temporary job protection is associated with larger 
increases in unemployment.  
Table 3: Short-time work, unemployment rate and employment rate 
Dependent variable:   Unemployment 
 
 Employment 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








































Period  2008-2009  2009  2008-2009  2009 
Wu Hausman test    p= . 0000  p = .0000  p= .0040  p = . 0352 
Sargan test   p = . 9602  p = .8941  p = .2066  p = . 1637 
Observations  200  100  200  100 
Note:  Employment (resp. unemployment, STW take-up) rate stands for the difference between the employment 
(resp. unemployment, short-time work take-up) rate and its average over the year 2007. All other variables are in 
level.  IV estimates (2SLS). *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. Standard 
deviations in brackets.  
 
                                                                 
1 We present the estimates with 2 stages least squares. Estimations with the GMM method yield similar results.  29 
 
The results for employment are presented in  Column  3  and 4. Independently of the  period 
considered, they are consistent with those obtained with the unemployment rate: the coefficient 
associated with short-time work take-up is not statistically different from one at the 5% level 
confidence rate. Moreover, regular employment protection has a positive impact on employment 
during the crisis.  
Table 4: Short-time work, permanent employment rate and temporary employment rate 
Dependent variable:   Permanent jobs 
 
 Temporary jobs 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








































Period  2008-2009  2009  2008-2009  2009 
Adj. R²  -  -  .058  .002 
Wu Hausman test    p= .0055  p = .0039  -  - 
Sargan test   p = .2039  p = .1348  -  - 
Observations  200  100  200  100 
Note:  Permanent jobs (resp. temporary jobs, STW take-up) stands for the difference between the permanent jobs 
(resp. temporary, short-time work take-up) rate and its average over the year 2007. All other variables are in level.   
Permanent jobs: IV estimates (2SLS). Temporary jobs: OLS estimates. *** statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 
at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of equation (1) for permanent and temporary jobs. 
The same set of instruments as before is selected. With these instruments, the assumption that 
short-time work is exogenous in equation (1), where permanent employment is the dependent 
variable, is rejected at the 1 % level of significance as shown by the p-value of the Wu Hausman 
test in Columns 1 and 2 of table 4. Moreover, the instruments pass the Sargan over-identification 
test. However, the assumption of exogeneity of short-time work is not rejected when temporary 
employment is the dependent variable. Accordingly, we present the results of OLS estimation 
when the dependent variable is the rate of temporary employment.
1 Table 4 shows that the 
                                                                 
1 2SLS estimation yields the same coefficient associated with short-time work, which is not significantly different 
from zero, as the OLS estimation presented in Table 4.  30 
 
coefficient associated with short-time work is close to one for permanent employment, but not 
significantly different from zero for temporary jobs. This suggests that short-time work is mainly 





Recent empirical studies suggest that short-time work programs have been quite successful in the 
recent downturn in preserving jobs and in keeping unemployment down. Our paper confirms 
this finding, for permanent workers who have benefited more from short-time compensation 
programs than temporary workers. All in all, it seems that short-time work programs used in the 
recent downturn had significant beneficial effects. This suggests that countries which do not have 
short-time compensation programs could benefit from their introduction.  
However,  special  attention  should  be  devoted  to  the  design  of  these  programs.  Empirical 
evidence indicates that short-time work programs had beneficial effects in the downturn. But 
their impact in the recovery period is not documented yet. More time is needed. Short-time work 
programs can induce inefficient reductions in working hours. They can also inefficiently lower 
the reallocation of jobs toward more productive jobs. In order to limit these negative effects of 
short-time work, which may become costly in the long run, two features should be built into their 
design. First, it is worth introducing experience-rating, which implies that social contributions 
paid by employers to finance unemployment insurance depend on the costs induced by their 
participation in  short-time  work  programs.  Longer participation in  the  program  should  yield 
higher  contribution  rates.  Second,  it  is  important  to  commit  to  stable  rules,  which  may  be 
designed under normal economic conditions - and not during recessions - in order to avoid that 
in turbulent periods pressure groups require excessively generous schemes, which can be difficult 
to turn off later on. Indeed, persistently high take-up rates can be costly for the society as a whole 
and  detrimental  to  some  categories  of  workers  non-eligible  to  short-time  compensation 
programs.  
As a final warning, it should be stressed that much remains to be known about the impact of 
short-time work. There are very few empirical studies devoted to this issue. Empirical evidence 
about the impact of short-time work in the recent recession is built on macroeconomic data. 
                                                                 
1 The same finding is obtained by Hijzen and Venn (2010). 31 
 
Macroeconomic evaluations have the advantage to identify a net global impact or short-time 
work, including all types of potential effects. But the conclusions of macroeconomic evaluations 
are necessarily drawn from a relatively small set of observations, which limits the ability to finely 
identify the impact of programs. Larger sets of observations collected at the firm-level would be 
needed to confirm these conclusions. As such, controlled experiments would be valuable to avoid 
the selection bias that could undermine this type of research.  
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